Fissuring and the Firm Exemption by Paul, Sanjukta
65 - BOOK PROOF - PAUL - FISSURING & THE FIRM EXEMPTION (DO NOT DELETE) 8/14/2019 10:07 AM 
 
FISSURING AND THE FIRM EXEMPTION 
SANJUKTA PAUL* 
I 
INTRODUCTION: ANTITRUST’S MONOPOLY ON LICENSING ECONOMIC 
COORDINATION 
Workers beyond the bounds of employment and other small players are 
deprived of coordination rights under fissuring1 in addition to being subject to 
the control of relatively large, powerful firms. But this absence of coordination 
rights is neither an inexorable force of nature as the economy changes, nor is it a 
free-standing legal fact. Rather, the conditions under which workers and small 
enterprises are deprived of coordination rights in these business arrangements 
are instead part of an overall allocation of coordination rights—an affirmative 
policy choice on the part of antitrust law—that grants coordination rights to some 
actors while denying them to others. Indeed, as I argue elsewhere, antitrust law’s 
basic function is to license some forms of economic coordination and bar others.2 
Private parties may not decide by contract whether they will or will not 
coordinate: they must have public approval to do so. Furthermore, where and 
how antitrust law has historically drawn, and today does draw, the line between 
exempt and non-exempt economic arrangements is not in reality outsourced to 
any external referent: not property law, not corporate law, and not economics. In 
the 1970’s, Robert Bork and others invoked the notion of “efficiency” internal to 
mainstream economics—thereby borrowing for a particular allocation of 
coordination rights its prestige—in order to bless unrelated and erroneous ideas 
about “productive efficiencies,” i.e., the virtues of authoritarian hierarchy, which 
are embodied in the traditional firm and extended under firm fissuring. In truth, 
coordination rights are allocated on the basis of self-referential criteria internal 
to antitrust law.3  
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 1.  DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014) (I use the term “fissuring” to refer to fissured business 
structures generally speaking, not only the workplace as such.). See also Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring 
Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOYOLA UNIV. CHICAGO L. J. 969 
(2016). 
 2.  Sanjukta M. Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020). 
 3.  Id. 
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This paper now applies that framework to first explain how “lead firms”—as 
David Weil calls them—in fissured business arrangements take advantage of the 
expansion of antitrust permission to engage in economic coordination in the form 
of control beyond the firm, as well as the contraction of antitrust permission to 
engage in coordination in the form of cooperation beyond the firm. In the first 
sense, lead firms—franchisors, firms that make use of individual or small 
independent contractors, and now many tech platforms—are able to control 
smaller actors in their orbits without the censure of antitrust law. In the second 
sense, these firms are protected from any countervailing power that these smaller 
actors might bring to bear upon their relationships with them. This paper then 
goes on to show how that lead firms’ coordination exceeds or stretches regions of 
both the deep grammar (in the sense of deeply held assumptions that aren’t 
necessarily expressly articulated) and the surface grammar (in the sense of 
expressly articulated doctrine) of antitrust law. Moreover, the bar on smaller 
actors’ coordination itself internalizes what I call “the firm exemption,” as I show 
through a close look at the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, which is perhaps the strongest articulation of that rule. 
The price coordination that takes place within a firm is typically—if one digs 
far enough—putatively justified by the property rights of investors, even though 
it is not logically derivable from them. Imagine a firm that sells a service: playing 
the organ for special events, for example. Organists who band together to engage 
in price coordination or market allocation are denied such coordination rights by 
antitrust, as indeed a recent prosecution by the FTC confirmed.4 On the other 
hand, if investors jointly create a corporation that then hires the same organists, 
their price-setting (or internal market allocation) activity is deemed untouchable 
by antitrust. Notably, this is currently also true even if the firm only contracts with 
the organists, even though that arrangement undercuts all the available reasons 
for the firm exemption in the first place. 
Many fissured business arrangements take this disjunction further. Imagine if 
the same corporation presents itself as a tech platform selling the use of an app 
to both organists and their customers. In the current regulatory environment, it 
will be able to engage in price coordination beyond firm boundaries: setting the 
price of a product it does not even purport to sell, namely organist services. At 
the same time, the organists themselves are barred from joint price-setting or 
joint bargaining; they are effectively forced to pay the corporation for use of the 
license to engage in price coordination that it receives free of charge from the 
state. 
Ride-hailing tech firms like Uber and Lyft, fast-food franchisors, as well as 
firms that rely primarily upon services provided by independent contractors, all 
engage in price coordination beyond firm boundaries. Meanwhile, the law 
prohibits the workers and small enterprises in the orbits of such firms from 
 
 4.  See Am. Guild of Organists, F.T.C. 151 0159 (2017). 
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engaging in economic coordination, either directly,5 or by selectively and 
inconsistently ascribing firm status as between antitrust and other areas of law, 
notably labor law. In each of these respects, antitrust’s affirmative edicts, its 
omissions, and its latent and softer influences upon policy all combine to extend 
its underlying express preference for allocating coordination rights to existing 
concentrations of economic power—even as the internal justifications for that 
preference comes increasingly undone. 
II 
THE EXPANSION OF COORDINATION RIGHTS IN FISSURED ARRANGEMENTS 
Antitrust’s fundamental function is to allocate economic coordination rights, 
demarcating spaces of competition and coordination in economic life.6 Moreover, 
the firm exemption creates the paradigm space for coordination chosen by 
today’s antitrust law.7 Applying this framework to the phenomenon of fissuring, 
and its legal treatment, we see more clearly both the tensions in the firm 
exemption and how this exemption has interacted with intentional business 
decisions aimed at expanding it. The dynamic that has driven this expansion of 
coordination rights involves four components: (1) developments in antitrust 
doctrine, notably in the area of vertical restraints but also the single entity 
doctrine, that have liberalized coordination rights centered in large, powerful 
firms; (2) the tacit expansion of the deeper-rooted legal concept of the firm and 
its boundaries within antitrust, i.e., the firm exemption; (3) intentional business 
practices, such as the replacement of employees with independent contractors, 
franchising, and “platform” arrangements like Uber’s, that have sought to 
legitimize themselves in the eyes of institutional actors and the public, in turn 
reinforcing both (1) and (2); and (4) arguments associated with law and 
economics scholarship about what sorts of business arrangements—and limits 
upon competition—are “efficiency-enhancing.” 
Policy debates sometimes proceed as if antitrust law is, or should be, simply 
an implementation of (4). But in fact, antitrust law tacitly relies upon legal 
categories at the level of either surface or deep grammar, even when it purports 
to simply implement economic theory.8 We see this in the context of fissuring in 
terms of the reliance upon legal categories furnished by the law of vertical 
restraints and at a deeper level by the firm exemption. Moreover, it is not even 
logically possible for antitrust to simply implement the prescriptions of economic 
theory, given that some prior normative limitations upon competition are both 
necessary and not themselves derivable from neutral principles. Instead, the 
administration of competition policy entails initial political and moral choices. 
 
 5.  Under its current interpretation by the courts, Section 1 of the Sherman Act bars much inter-
firm horizontal coordination, including price coordination. See 15 USC §1 (1890); FTC v. Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 6.  Paul, supra note 2. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Paul, supra note 2. 
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The doctrinal mechanisms of the expanded permission to exert control 
beyond the firm—what I am calling the legal surface grammar—are the law of 
vertical restraints and to some extent the single entity doctrine, both of which 
have been made significantly more permissive since the late 1970’s. Meanwhile, 
the coordination rights granted to small players have been narrowed through an 
increasingly rigid norm against horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries.9 
Yet despite these superficially favorable developments from the perspective 
of firms experimenting with new business arrangements, a deeper disconnect 
plagues their antitrust treatment. In today’s fissured business arrangements, even 
the relatively thin putative justifications for this asymmetric allocation of 
coordination rights, centered in antitrust’s firm exemption, have come unmoored 
from actual conditions. The firm exemption and its expansion in the Borkian 
revolution are grounded ultimately in arguments about the productive 
efficiencies that flow from managerial hierarchies and enterprise integration.10 
But these arguments about economies of scale, and about the efficiencies of 
managerial hierarchies, are centered largely upon the manufacturing context, 
whereas many of today’s fissured business arrangements involve retail or 
services.11 Even more, as the rest of this Part shows, insofar as fissured business 
arrangements are precisely defined by reorganizing intra-firm relations as inter-
firm ones, they continue to claim the benefits of antitrust’s firm exemption even 
as—according to their own self-representations—the conditions of its 
applicability (assuming, arguendo, their validity) no longer apply. 
A. Franchising 
Franchising typifies the dynamic that has driven the expansion of large firms’ 
coordination rights under conditions of business fissuring: an iterative interaction 
between shifting legal norms and affirmative decisions about structuring business 
arrangements. Franchisors succeeded in normalizing their business model in the 
eyes of the public, institutional actors, and the decisional law, relying to a large 
extent upon arguments that the business arrangement is efficiency-enhancing, 
ultimately benefiting consumers.12 However, aspects of the standard franchising 
 
 9.  Infra, part III. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (holding minimum fee 
schedules for lawyers violated § 1 of the Sherman Act); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States., 435 
U.S. 679 (1978) (finding Society’s prevention of competitive bidding by members was per se illegal); FTC 
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (ruling against an agreement among 
independent trial lawyers to withhold services until compensation for appointments was increased). 
 10.  Paul, supra note 2.  
 11.  The literature on operational efficiencies to be realized through concentration and managerial 
hierarchies was largely based on the manufacturing context. See, e.g., FREDERIC M. SCHERER ET AL., 
THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS STUDY (1975); 
David B. Audretsch, Corporate Form and Spatial Form, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC 
GEOGRAPHY 333 (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., 2000); F.M. Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating 
Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE. L.J. 974 (1977). 
 12.  See Brian Callaci, Vertical Power and the Creation of a Fissured Workplace: The Case of 
Franchising, 2, 11 (U. Mass. Amherst, Dept. Econ., Working Paper, Sep. 5, 2018) (finding economists 
and economic historians have largely emphasized franchising as firms’ response to “exogenous 
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business model still outstrip the now-permissive vertical restraints cases, and 
reveal tensions in the reigning consumer welfare standard. 
Overall, by confining antitrust-immunized control relations largely to the 
space within the firm—and to a few more democratic arrangements outside the 
firm—mid-century antitrust had historically placed some limits on the 
unreciprocal control exerted by franchisors over franchisees. Mid-century 
antitrust took a dim view of control imposed through vertical, contractual 
restraints, for example by franchisors upon franchisees. Importantly, this view 
was motivated more by a norm of non-domination than by an idea of realizing 
ideal competitive prices, or of attaining the lowest possible consumer prices.13 
The Borkian turn in antitrust law that took hold in the 1970s worked to remove 
these limits on vertical restraints.14 By doing so, it demonstrated that its 
fundamental preference for allocating coordination rights is not only within firms, 
but also by large, powerful firms (at least so long as that coordination too is in 
the form of control over less-powerful actors). Around the same period, the 
Borkian turn expanded antitrust law’s concept of the firm itself, to capture 
parent-subsidiary relationships and other corporate groups, and thus extended 
antitrust immunity to any coordination between separate corporations within 
these relationships.15 The single entity doctrine, as it is called, expressly inscribes 
the preference for economic coordination in the form of control, preferably 
grounded in concentrated ownership interests.16 Franchisors have used and relied 
upon both of these changes in antitrust law to justify their control over 
franchisees and at times, franchisees’ employees. 
Fast-food franchisors coordinate their franchising families various ways. They 
exert control over key elements of franchisees’ supply, labor, and product 
decisions. Notably, they even exert control over the prices of the products sold 
 
technological changes” by “adopt[ing] more efficient organizational techniques”) and 11. See also, e.g., 
ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 108 (1978) (arguing that vertical restraints imposed by 
contract are efficient and benefit consumers).   
 13.  See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (finding vertically imposed 
maximum prices by oil company on gas station re-sellers was illegal, where the Court’s reasoning is based 
as much upon the freedom of the small dealers, as it is on promoting the competitive price); United States 
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding that geographical and other restrictions upon 
franchisees’ sale of goods, once franchisees had taken title, violated Section 1). See also United States. v. 
Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (holding vertical restrictions on gas station operators 
by the oil company were impermissible, and reasoning that gas station operators were tenants, not 
employees, and thus principles of subordination inherent in hierarchical vertical coordination were 
inappropriate). See also Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy and Labor Market Power, 82 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 3, at 45 2019.  
 14.  Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (expanding the permission of 
geographical market allocation restraints placed by franchisors upon franchisees); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3 (1997) (legalizing maximum price restraints by powerful firms upon small re-sellers); Leegin 
Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (permitting minimum price restraints upon 
re-sellers).  
 15.  Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding parent company and 
subsidiary incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act). See also Paul, 
supra note 2.  
 16.  Id.; Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191–92, 200-01 (2010). 
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by franchisee firms, typically in the direction of driving them down. One 
McDonald’s franchisee noted that “participation in deals and pricing is voluntary 
only in theory,” and that on an occasion when its coffee price was a nickel over 
the franchisor-advertised sale price, “the head of the McDonald’s region came in 
and he said: ‘You are over. You can’t do this.’”17 Some other franchisors even 
more straightforwardly set the prices charged by franchisee firms; for example, 
janitorial franchisors often directly bargain contracts with customers on 
franchisees’ behalf.18 Burger King, like McDonald’s, exerts the same downward 
pressure on its franchisees’ prices through its “Value Menu.”19 
Franchisors have also placed limits upon worker mobility within franchise 
“families” through so-called no-poaching provisions placed into franchisee 
contracts. In the past, franchisors have successfully claimed immunity for these 
controls under Copperweld, or the single entity doctrine, thereby claiming that 
franchisees are effectively extensions of the franchisor itself.20 Such provisions 
have recently come in for new criticism, and have been challenged by workers in 
a number of pending cases.21 In the current disputes, some franchisors have again 
raised the single entity defense, but thus far a judge has not ratified it. To 
expressly ratify this theory would be to make explicit the selective application of 
firm status to franchise “families” as between antitrust and labor law. Franchisees 
themselves are denied coordination rights by antitrust law,22 further cementing 
franchisors’ power. Meanwhile, franchisees’ employees’ fight for coordination 
rights, for example in the form of unionization, has also been frustrated by 
franchisors’ position that they are completely separate from franchisees, which 
would require workers to separately unionize numerous small franchisees. In 
short, franchisors have thus far been permitted to disclaim affiliation with 
 
 17.  Jana Kasperkevic, McDonald’s franchise owners: what they really think about the fight for $15, 
THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2015. 
 18.  WEIL, supra note 1.  
 19.  Burger King Corp. v. E-Z Eating 8th Corp., No. 07-20181, 2008 WL 11330723 (S.D. Fla., May 
22, 2008) (documenting an order on motion for summary judgment in lawsuit by franchisor Burger King 
Corporation against franchisees for breach of contract, on the ground that they shut down prior to the 
contract’s expiration. Franchisees counter-claimed that they were operating under “extreme losses” due 
to franchisor’s imposition of the “Value Menu”). See also Burger King Corp. v. E-Z Eating, 572 F.3d 
1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding summary judgment for Burger King Corporation on the ground that its 
imposition of the Value Menu on franchisors did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing). 
 20.  See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993) (dismissing former employee’s 
claim that “no-switching” provision in franchising agreement violated Sherman Act, on the basis that 
franchisor and franchisee cannot conspire under Copperweld). 
 21.  A number of plaintiffs have recently challenged coordination within franchise families that limits 
the hiring of former employees. See, e.g., DesLandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-cv-04857, 2018 
WL 3105955 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018); Ion v. Pizza Hut, LLC., No. 4:17-cv-00788 (E.D. Tex., dismissed 
July 16, 2018); Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018). Meanwhile, 
franchisors continue to disclaim single entity status for purpose of labor regulation, whether of wages or 
collective bargaining. See, e.g., Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 14-CV-02096-RS, 2016 US Dist. LEXIS 
10876 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016) (arising under the California Labor Code); McDonald’s USA, LLC, 363 
N.L.R.B. 144 (2016) (dealing with a complaint arising under the National Labor Relations Act). 
 22.  The legal basis for denying franchisees coordination rights is discussed in Part III, infra.  
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franchisee firms altogether under labor law, even as they frequently claim that 
franchisees are extensions of the firm under antitrust, in both cases cementing 
their exclusive coordination rights in the overall arrangement. 
The pending no-poach cases also illustrate the operation of the law of vertical 
restraints and franchisors’ attempts to stretch its limits.  To see this, note first that 
even franchisors’ control over franchisee product pricing decisions ought to be 
uncertain territory. As noted, franchisors exert control over consumer prices 
charged by franchisees, in addition to aspects of their dealings with suppliers and 
workers. Even under the existing law’s profound preference for vertical control 
over horizontal coordination, franchisors’ control over franchisee pricing—which 
in turn has direct, negative implications for franchisees’ labor relationships and 
workers’ wages23—does not obviously fit within the parameters of legal vertical 
restraints. The paradigm cases, from GTE Sylvania (geographic market 
allocation) to Khan (maximum prices) to Leegin (minimum prices), all deal with 
re-sale of a product sold by the actor seeking to impose the restraint. Franchisors 
do not sell hamburgers to franchisees, who then re-sell them. This problem is not 
necessarily resolved by extending the principles of these cases to intangible 
property—such as the franchise brand—which are covered.24 
There is, in any event, no credible argument for extending these precedents 
to labor-facing restraints imposed by franchisors upon franchisees. Franchisors 
do not hire out workers to franchisees. No proprietary technology licensed by 
franchisors to franchisees is implicated in those relationships. Yet the 
Department of Justice chose to file a brief in these pending cases effectively 
supporting franchisors’ position and suggesting that no-poach agreements 
limiting mobility among some of the lowest-wage, most vulnerable workers have 
legally cognizable benefits.25 This is notable in part because it dramatizes the 
tensions in antitrust law’s current governing normative framework. The DOJ 
brief purports to treat labor market restraints symmetrically with product market 
restraints. But this is belied by their own arguments about the putative 
countervailing efficiencies of no-poach agreements, which are framed purely in 
terms of consumer benefits, namely lower prices. This points up a basic tension 
within the existing legal framework, which simultaneously claims to treat worker 
welfare equally with consumer welfare, but which only admits evidence of 
countervailing benefits to consumers, primarily price benefits, when evaluating 
forms of permitted coordination. In short, the DOJ’s briefs supporting 
 
 23.  See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, McDonald’s franchisee says the company told her “just pay your 
employees less,” WASH. POST, Aug.  4, 2014. 
 24.  The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property do 
extend the principles of resale price maintenance to intangible technologies, but even if hamburgers could 
be said to qualify as incorporating a “licensed technology,” these guidelines refer to price maintenance 
and not maximum prices required by franchisors. DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.2 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/IPguidelines/download [https://perma.cc/4T6Y-YBVM]. 
 25.  Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Harris v. CJ Star, LLC, No. 
2:18-cv-00247 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019), ECF No. 38. 
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franchisors’ position in the pending cases brought by fast food workers to 
invalidate employee no-poach agreements imposed by franchisors upon 
franchisees stretch existing tendencies in the law to favor control by powerful 
firms, which is presumed to confer consumer benefits. 
In effect, the DOJ’s brief seeks to enshrine in the official, surface grammar of 
the law what has heretofore been only a tacit expansion at the level of its deeper 
grammar, where the firm exemption partially resides. That tacit expansion of the 
borders of the firm exemption has been achieved through decades of creating 
facts on the ground by naturalizing franchisors’ business model, and through 
economic arguments that these arrangements are efficiency-enhancing because 
of lower consumer prices. 
B. Ride-Hailing Firms 
In his account of the political economy of franchising in its critical decades of 
regulatory change, Brian Callaci has noted that franchisors’ endeavor to 
“persuade regulators, legislators, and courts that their business form was sui 
generis and should not be regulated according to existing conceptions” will “be 
familiar to observers of twenty-first century gig economy firms.”26 The ride-
hailing apps represent the forward prow of “platform” arrangements that are, by 
all accounts, popping up throughout the service sector. These firms set the price 
of rides. They also contend that that those rides are sold by independent 
businesses—drivers—not by the firms. Therefore, these firms facilitate 
horizontal price coordination among sellers beyond firm boundaries, leading at 
least one district court judge to recognize a cognizable claim for a per se violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.27 Overall, the Uber problem is a more brazen 
version of the franchising problem, and it creates a more obvious conflict under 
existing antitrust law. Still, it is basically continuous with franchising—a fact that 
could either lead us to revisit the asymmetric allocation of coordination rights in 
franchising, or to bless the even more starkly asymmetric allocation of 
coordination rights in the ride-hailing sector. The current antitrust authorities 
have signaled their preference for the latter. Meanwhile, the antitrust 
implications of platform labor/services arrangements remain far less fully 
explored than, for example, their labor and employment law implications.28 
 
 26.  Brian Callaci, Vertical Dis-Integration and the Creation of a New Business Form: Franchising 
1960-1980, 10 (Washington Center for Equitable Growth Working Paper Series, 2018). 
 27.  See, e.g., Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15-9796, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Uber’s 
subsequent successful motion to compel arbitration in this dispute with riders prevents us from seeing 
this legal contest unfold. 
 28.  A few exceptions include Marshall Steinbaum, supra note 13, Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the 
Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323 (2016); Sanjukta Paul, Uber 
as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and its Implication, BJELL 2017; Mark Anderson & 
Max Huffman, The Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm, a Cartel, or Something in 
Between?, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859 (2017). Huffman and Anderson acknowledge that Uber has 
an antitrust problem. Without taking a definitive position on whether Uber would be subject to the per 
se rule or the rule of reason under current law, they argue that its business model ought to be permitted 
as a policy matter, and propose changes to antitrust to accommodate it: namely a liberalization of the 
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What public debate there has been on the antitrust implications of the ride-
hailing firms’ pricing practices has focused to a large extent on algorithmic 
pricing.29 Algorithmic pricing is certainly an interesting and important topic in 
itself, but the immediate antitrust questions relating to Uber and similar firms do 
not stem from the fact that they set prices for ride services through an algorithm. 
Rather, they stem from the fact that Uber sets prices for ride services in the first 
place. Similarly, there are a slew of articles on the “efficiencies” brought about 
by Uber. Deeper normative questions aside for the moment, these are not in 
themselves legal justifications for Uber’s coordination; they must fit within 
existing legal categories that, in effect, condition the justificatory power of such 
putative benefits. This conditioning role for legal categories is non-optional: 
arguments about efficiency are not free-standing but ultimately themselves 
presuppose legal categories—notably, the firm exemption—for organizing 
coordination. 
These firms have even more obvious problems than franchising in the surface 
structure of existing antitrust law. A ride-hailing tech platform cannot 
straightforwardly argue that its relationship to its drivers constitutes a single 
entity for antitrust purposes, as this is inconsistent with its claim that drivers are 
its consumers, and is also inconsistent with its defense in employment cases 
alleging that drivers are really employees. In the employee misclassification 
cases, these firms argue they lack control over drivers and engage in little or no 
top-down coordination.30 Since ownership is already dispersed in terms of the 
primary relevant physical capital (vehicles), top-down coordination simply is the 
only other factor the firms have available to argue under Copperweld. Uber’s 
ability to immunize its coordination under the Copperweld line of cases is 
doubtful; its ability to do so and to maintain its defense in the employee 
misclassification cases is virtually impossible. 
Moreover, Uber and similar firms are unlikely to succeed in showing that 
their price coordination constitutes a permissible vertical restraint if current law 
is interpreted fairly. The paradigm cases that liberalized the law of vertical 
restraints never immunized price restraints as far removed from the transaction 
that Uber claims to have with its drivers. Uber and similar firms say that they 
license the use of software to drivers, which facilitates drivers’ transactions with 
riders. But the price restraints Uber places on drivers relate to the rides 
themselves. As Judge Rakoff pointed out in rejecting Uber’s argument of 
 
Copperweld defense that would allow for the consideration of degrees of integration and risk-sharing, 
rather than a binary decision on single entity status. To the extent that they argue that rule of reason 
treatment is not foreclosed for Uber, however, Anderson and Huffman’s position also generally supports 
drivers’ own coordination, although they do not directly address it. Other commentators, many of them 
economists, also argue that Uber confers consumer benefits without making it clear what the legal 
relevance of those benefits is, given the nature of Uber’s business model. See, e.g., Judd Cramer & Alan 
Krueger, Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of Uber, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (2016). 
 29.  See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 
100 MINN. L. REV. 1323 (2016). 
 30.  See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Tech.’s., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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verticality and denying its motion to dismiss the Section 1 lawsuit brought against 
it by consumers, drivers are not re-selling ride services sold to them by Uber, 
which is the classic re-sale justifying vertical restraints under existing case-law.31 
GTE Sylvania involved the re-sale of TV’s, where the TV market was the subject 
of the restraint at issue. State Oil Co. v. Khan involved the re-sale of gas and oil, 
where the prices of those commodities were the subject of the restraint at issue. 
Leegin involved the re-sale of clothing, whose prices were the subject of the 
restraint at issue. None involved price restraints on commodities (here, ride 
services) that were themselves unrelated to the commodity (here, use of the app) 
sold by the restraining firm (Uber) to the purchaser-firm (drivers). It is true that 
both maximum and minimum price restraints can now relate to an intangible 
product, like the app, but that does not change the structure of the transactions 
and relationships at issue: drivers are not re-selling the use of the app to riders.32 
Nor can it be plausibly argued that what they are selling to riders is a “product 
incorporating the licensed technology.”33 And indeed, the few law review articles 
that do consider the Section 1 implications of Uber’s pricing practices in any 
detail do not take seriously the possibility that Uber’s price coordination 
constitutes a permissible vertical restraint, although they may advocate other 
legal reforms that would permit it.34 
The problem here is that the many efficiencies claimed for Uber are not 
legally salient unless Uber shows that its pricing practices fall within the existing 
law of vertical restraints.  Putting that problem aside for the moment, the 
efficiencies claimed for Uber fall roughly into two categories: (1) the app works 
well, reducing transaction costs of driver-rider bargains; or, less frequently 
articulated, (2) Uber avoids the responsibilities of employment and the business 
risks of vehicle ownership, thereby reducing costs.35 The second of these 
contentions is transparently question-begging.  
As to (1), let’s indeed assume that the app works very well in achieving the 
functional goal of matching drivers and riders in time and space, which is the 
essence of the claim. The problem is that this is neither here nor there with 
respect to the legal question. The issue is not whether the app is a great invention. 
There have been a great many great inventions; and while there may at times be 
something specific about a particular invention that forms the basis for a 
particular legal right, the greatness of an invention does not itself create a generic 
entitlement to selectively preferential legal treatment. The claim would have to 
 
 31.  See Ord. on Motion to Dismiss, Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817.  
 32.  Note that this argument does not necessarily imply acceptance of the “hub and spoke theory” 
endorsed by Judge Rakoff in his order denying Uber’s motion to dismiss. The hub and spoke theory is 
an exception to the applicability of the rule of reason for vertical restraints, but a) implies that the vertical 
arrangement comes within the existing principles justifying the rule of reason in the first place, and b) 
requires agreement among the “spokes” (here, drivers), which is unlikely to be met.  
 33.  ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 24.  
 34.  Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, The Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm, 
a Cartel, or Something in Between?, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859 (2017). 
 35.  Anderson & Huffman, supra note 34. 
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be that the price coordination activity itself generates operational efficiencies. 
But there is no argument for that. The app could match riders in space and time 
without setting prices, and that would exhaust all the efficiencies have been 
claimed for it.36 
The price coordination activity performed by the apps might be valuable for 
a completely different reason, namely that it performs a market stabilization 
function. Market stabilization largely isn’t recognized as a good in the current 
antitrust framework, at least not officially. And of course, a drivers’ union would 
perform market stabilization functions as well, as indeed unions, trade 
associations, and other organizations can do more generally.37 But again, this 
can’t be the reason to permit Uber’s price coordination without also justifying 
Uber drivers’ collective bargaining, or for that matter, without also justifying a 
cartel of drivers who own their own vehicles and simply share an app that 
performs a price coordination function. This is a basic and deep tension in the 
law and in antitrust thinking, because on some level antitrust actors do seem to 
acknowledge the need for market stabilization when thinking about some specific 
cases, but the official principles do not. This leads then to the selective application 
of antitrust rules in favor of large, powerful actors’ coordination and against small 
players’. It creeps in even to Anderson and Huffman’s argument, as they 
acknowledge that price coordination is not relevant to the official efficiency 
defenses, but that drivers are unlikely to participate without it.38 
Related to the market stabilization issue, Anderson and Huffman at times 
describe the resultant efficiencies in terms of Uber’s enhanced business revenue, 
which in turn passes benefits on to consumers.39 Not only is there no good 
principle, however, to define enhanced business revenue as a social benefit to be 
weighed in favor of coordination, while refusing to consider the benefits of 
reasonable wages in the same manner, but also the firms foreclose the use of that 
argument by also defining drivers as themselves businesses. By this logic, 
anything that drivers do to enhance their business revenue is also an efficiency to 
be weighed against any losses from coordination. 
Finally, Uber has a better chance of avoiding per se treatment under the 
principles articulated in a minor strain of Section 1 case law that is more tolerant 
to horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries—but it has a better chance 
precisely to the extent that drivers’ own coordination would also not be subject 
to the per se rule under them. For example, Appalachian Coals would directly 
militate in favor of permitting drivers’ coordination because it straightforwardly 
acknowledges market stabilization in the face of destructive competition as a 
legitimate criterion for antitrust decision-making.40 
 
 36.  To their credit, Anderson and Huffman acknowledge this point.  
 37.  See, e.g., FREDERIC S. LEE, MICROECONOMICS: A HETERODOX APPROACH (2017). 
 38.  Anderson & Huffman, supra note 34. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).  
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However, if the DOJ’s position in the pending franchising no-poach cases 
succeeds in expanding the law of vertical restraints to become even more 
permissive, this would have favorable implications for Uber’s ability to argue that 
the price restraints it places on drivers are in fact permissible vertical restraints. 
It would also even further crystallize the preference for economic coordination 
imposed by a large, powerful actor—even when functionally indistinguishable 
from voluntary coordination by many smaller actors—on the part of the current 
antitrust paradigm. 
C. Independent Contractor Firms 
Finally, these anomalies in antitrust treatment of various forms of 
coordination extend to an older form of business fissuring: namely firms that rely 
principally upon independent contractors, and which then sell a commodity that 
in substantial part comprises those services. These firms’ right to engage in price 
coordination has not been seriously questioned under antitrust, though their 
structure departs from the conventional justification for the firm exemption. 
Antitrust’s firm exemption relies ultimately upon an internal organization 
based on command rather than contract.41 This command is derived from the 
relationship of agency—in other words, employment. And indeed, under the 
positive law, the very thing that defined an independent contractor is that she’s 
not an agent of the firm.42 But without her agency, what “firm-ness” is left? Even 
after recasting almost all of its prior employment relationships as commercial 
contracts, such a firm retains the privileges of the firm exemption. 
To take an example, many trucking firms in the United States today fit the 
template I just gave: they buy truck-driving services from individuals whom they 
characterize as independent contractors, and they sell trucking services to their 
customers. They typically have a few administrative employees, but their core 
product is not only made by independent contractors, it is the very service 
performed by those individuals. Other than obtaining contracts with customers 
and bargaining those contracts, such a firm usually does not do much else. It has 
no other production facilities, and according to its own self-characterization, it 
does not extensively monitor drivers’ provision of services. 
Now consider the antitrust treatment of such a firm. The trucking firm gets to 
set the prices it charges its customers for trucking services. That seems natural 
enough. But is it? Functionally, this is a form of price coordination: the firm is 
setting the prices for the services performed by all, say, twenty drivers. Imagine 
that in this particular market for trucking services, there are four other firms of 
twenty drivers each. Now suppose that instead of working for the first firm, these 
same twenty drivers begin working directly for customers, but form a bargaining 
unit for the purpose of negotiating their contracts with customers. They agree 
internally upon rates and they do not deviate from rates set by their designated 
 
 41.  See Paul, supra note 2. 
 42.  See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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bargaining agent. Without changing much, if anything at all, about the tangible 
economic activity that is taking place, we have moved from a situation in which 
the right to coordinate prices is uncontested for antitrust purposes, to one that 
courts and federal competition authorities would undoubtedly label a “garden 
variety price-fixing ring.”43 Note that between these examples, there is no 
difference in effects on third parties, whether they are customers, suppliers or 
rival firms or associations. Indeed, Bork himself acknowledged that there is no 
such difference in market effects between firms and cartels, until one brings in 
the putative efficiencies and thus consumer benefits of the firm’s internal agency 
relationships.44 Having removed those agency relationships from the 
organization of the production or service in question by transforming them into 
contracts, however, the justification for favorable antitrust treatment also 
disappears. 
Two responses are possible: (1) that the trucking firm contributes benefits 
from integration that are not sufficient for the employment relationship, but that 
are sufficient to justify preferential antitrust treatment; and (2) that the truck 
drivers, if they wish to avail themselves of that preferential treatment, have the 
same legal right to achieve this beneficial integration as the owner of the trucking 
firm does. As to objection (1), it is not at all clear that this needle can be threaded. 
Many trucking firms in fact contribute very little functional integration other than 
bargaining customer contracts. To the extent they do more, they very likely are 
misclassifying drivers as contractors. There is also no basis not to consider the 
many other benefits that the truck drivers might claim for their economic 
arrangement, not least of them the ability to earn a reasonable rate and stabilize 
the market, which would tend to have effects upon operations as well. The binary 
distinction between bargaining integration and productive integration is 
moreover both false and self-fulfilling: if drivers were able to form a bargaining 
unit, they very well might use the increased revenue to make upgrades and 
investments, just as the firm would—perhaps even in a way that was integrated 
across the group. 
As to objection (2), simple incorporation will not protect the truck drivers. 
An incorporated firm of truck drivers who own their own trucks—just as they do 
in the independent contractor-based trucking firm—and who rotate bargaining 
responsibilities with customers would not be immunized from Section 1 liability 
the way that the trucking firm automatically is.45 A decision-maker is likely to 
find that this arrangement is simply an incorporated cartel. In that event, the 
drivers might not even have the opportunity to prove up benefits from 
coordination, because the per se rule would likely apply. Yet if the same drivers 
subordinate themselves to an owner and a manager, precisely the same price 
coordination in precisely the same market is automatically immunized. This 
 
 43.  ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 108 (1978).  
 44.   See, e.g., id. at 264 (“Both internal growth and horizontal merger eliminate rivalry, and they do 
so more permanently than do cartel arrangements. Prices are fixed and markets allocated within firms.”). 
 45.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191–92, 200-01 (2010). 
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simple example makes the point stark, because it is very unlikely that a court 
would ever look for more functional integration in the case where there is a 
separate owner and a manager—even if they are not doing anything particularly 
useful or socially productive. Thanks to the firm exemption, together with the per 
se rule against horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries, our system 
paradoxically rewards an arrangement in which there is a boss to profit from the 
drivers’ labor, while denying the individuals who perform the work the privilege 
to coordinate prices. 
III 
THE CONTRACTION OF COORDINATION RIGHTS IN FISSURED ARRANGEMENTS 
In each of the fissured business arrangements discussed above, the expansion 
of coordination rights beyond the traditional boundaries of the firm exemption 
for the more powerful actor is accompanied by a contraction of coordination 
rights for the less powerful ones in its orbit. Antitrust denies to franchisees any 
rights to engage in economic coordination, either as to their own price-setting or 
as to their bargains with the powerful franchisor firms. Franchisors’ control over 
franchisees is thus underwritten by not one but two antitrust rules: the allocation 
of coordination rights to franchisors, and the denial of coordination rights to 
franchisees. Uber and similar firms, meanwhile, insist that their drivers have no 
right to coordinate under antitrust; and thus far, the law has denied them that 
right. Indeed, Uber has argued that the per se rule bars drivers’ coordination and 
that a local ordinance authorizing collective bargaining among drivers is 
therefore subject to federal preemption by the Sherman Act.46 And independent 
contractor truck drivers have been sued by trucking firms when they engaged in 
concerted action to improve their positions; the law has also largely assumed that 
they lack coordination rights.47 
If franchisees were able to bring countervailing power to bear in their 
bargains with franchisors, the result might not only be an ability to bargain more 
meaningfully with their own employees,48 but also bargaining over joint 
responsibility for those employment relationships themselves. Uber drivers who 
formed a union and bargained their contracts with Uber might, building on these 
connections, put themselves in a position to launch an app of their own. 
Assuming it could pass muster under an unreformed firm exemption in the first 
place,49 this possibility has little practical chance of coming organically into 
fruition without, at a minimum, the initial integration created by a bargaining 
 
 46.  Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 47.  Paul, supra note 1. 
 48.  See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, McDonald’s Franchisee Says the Company Just Told her “Just Pay Your 
Employees Less,” WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/ 
2014/08/04/first-person-kathryn-slater-carter-the-franchise-owner-taking-on-mcdonalds/?noredirect= 
on&utm_term=.85a5d857adca [https://outline.com/UBtDhH].  
 49.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191–92, 200-01 (2010). See also Paul, 
supra note 2. 
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agency or a union.50 This would be the case even putting aside the structural 
disadvantages a driver-owned business would continue to face in competition 
with the platforms, given the latter’s relationships to the financial markets.51 
Similar possibilities attend organizing by independent contractor workers. 
Fed Trade Comm’n v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n is the Court’s 
strongest articulation of the rule against horizontal coordination beyond firm 
boundaries, and it clearly articulates antitrust’s current preferred and disfavored 
forms of coordination. In particular, the opinion shows that the antitrust norms 
that the Court applied internalize deference to coordination within firms, singling 
out coordination among individual or small service-providers’ coordination for 
censure while ignoring other forms of coordination. Like the current antitrust 
paradigm more generally, the Court selectively applied a putatively general norm 
in favor of competition and against coordination. The Court also then extended 
antitrust’s conventional allocation of coordination rights—privileging large, 
powerful business firms as the primary mechanism of market coordination—into 
the First Amendment law of expressive boycotts itself, relying upon that 
particular antitrust logic in order to decide the boycotts that are and are not 
protected by the First Amendment. 
A. The Court’s Antitrust Analysis 
Trial Lawyers applied the per se rule against horizontal price coordination 
beyond firm boundaries to concerted action by individual service-providers and 
micro-enterprises.52 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts and 
conspiracies “in restraint of trade.”53 Judicial construction of Section 1 prohibits 
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade, and pronounces certain sorts of 
agreements unreasonable per se. Once so categorized, such agreements need not, 
indeed cannot, be re-examined for reasonability by future courts. Horizontal 
price coordination beyond firm boundaries, otherwise known as price-fixing, is 
currently considered per se unreasonable. Each of the decision-makers in the 
Trial Lawyers case, from the ALJ to the Supreme Court, agreed that the lawyers’ 
boycott was a “classic restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.”54 Upon the finding of such coordination, a fact-finder is neither 
required nor permitted to consider any other factors—for example, whether the 
 
 50.  See, e.g., Sandeep Vaheesan & Nathan Schneider, Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly 
Strategy, PENN STATE L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (making this point). 
 51.  Uber and similar firms have relied massively on venture capital funding. A producers’ 
cooperative by its nature would not seek such funding—and would likely not be able to borrow on 
favorable terms either, as a result. This in turn would affect its ability to compete with a firm like Uber, 
which consistently loses money, apparently in service of a future operational pay-off (and in service of a 
payoff in terms of share value once it goes public, in the meanwhile). 
 52.  FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 53.  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890). 
 54.  Id.   
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resultant prices were reasonable or whether countervailing benefits flowed from 
the coordination.55 
The Court also noted that concerted reduction or stoppage in the sale of a 
commodity, which the lawyers’ strike constituted, is similarly prohibited per se.56 
More generally, concerted withholding of supply—of labor or services—is of 
course the very essence of a labor strike, and relatedly is one of the few forms of 
economic leverage available to those who own little or no capital.57 While 
antitrust would thus condemn a labor strike absent the labor exemption, and does 
condemn strikes beyond the bounds of the exemption, it is worth noting that the 
antitrust notion of harm from “reduced output” fails to accurately capture the 
mechanism by which a strike or boycott in fact works. According to current 
conventional antitrust theory, reduced output is an antitrust harm in itself 
(because it is by definition economically inefficient, which also usually means that 
it automatically results in increased prices), not because it increases the 
bargaining power of the seller to extract desired changes to the 
contract/relationship in question (such as a higher price or wage). 
But the latter, not the former, is how a strike or boycott actually works. Wages 
are not increased following a strike because workers reduced their labor supply, 
which automatically increased the price of labor. Instead, wages go up after a 
successful strike because the business is economically harmed by the work 
stoppage in specific ways, which in turn gives workers bargaining power to effect 
desired changes to the contract. These two mechanisms—the real one, and the 
theoretical one—are far apart. Strikes work because of specific business harms 
that result from reduced operations. They are mediated through human volition 
at the bargaining table, not through the supposedly impersonal workings of 
market price.58 
In applying the per se rule against the lawyers’ strike, the Court adopted the 
antitrust vision in which markets are coordinated mainly through the mechanism 
of the firm, while other forms of coordination are prohibited or disfavored.59 The 
fact that the coordinating mechanism in this case is a public entity rather than a 
putatively profit-maximizing business firm simply highlights the depth at which 
these underlying assumptions are rooted, as further discussed below. To support 
the centrality of the blanket prohibition upon horizontal coordination beyond 
firm boundaries to the overall allocation of coordination rights under antitrust, 
the Court approvingly quoted Robert Bork’s statement that permission to prove 
 
 55.  Id. at 435. See also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 56.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 423 (“This constriction of supply is the essence 
of price-fixing, whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price, which will decrease the quantity 
demanded, or by agreeing upon an output, which will increase the price offered.”) (quoting the Court of 
Appeals).  
 57.  Of course, this point is limited by the lack of protection for economic strikes under the NLRA. 
Still, an economic strike is permitted under labor law, if not protected.  
 58.  For an alternate view, see LEE supra note 37; NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
MARKETS (2001).  
 59.   Paul, supra note 2.  
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lack of economic power in cases of horizontal price coordination would be 
administratively unworkable, introducing complexities of market definition into 
such cases.60 
The Court also characterized the per se rule against horizontal price 
coordination as something more fundamental, from a normative standpoint, than 
a mere rule of administrative simplicity or convenience. In so doing, the Court 
made a conceptual error. Analogizing horizontal price coordination to inherently 
dangerous activities like stunt flying in congested areas, each instance of which 
poses some threat to physical safety, it reasoned that each instance of price 
coordination poses “some threat to the free market.”61 To support this assertion, 
the Court again cited Bork, this time for the proposition that no one will engage 
in price coordination unless it has the power to affect market prices. 
The Court of Appeals had taken the position that the First Amendment ought 
to protect the strike (as discussed in the next section) absent a showing that the 
lawyers had market power. But the deeper problem is not that price coordination 
is not anti-competitive—a basically question-begging term absent further 
specification of the inevitable limits upon competition—or that the price 
coordination of small actors will not affect market prices. In fact, the lawyers did 
collectively have market power in the narrow sense: their coordination had the 
ability to affect prices. As we can see from the record, absent intervention by the 
competition authorities, it was poised to do just that. The problem is not that the 
lawyers did not have an opportunity to prove a lack of market power, but that 
market power, in the narrow sense recognized by the antitrust paradigm of Bork 
and Trial Lawyers, is an insufficient criterion of permitting coordination. 
The actual problem is that affecting prices always assumes a normative 
baseline that the conventional antitrust paradigm leaves obscure but that is 
fundamentally influenced by intra-firm coordination. Here that baseline was set 
by the District’s own coordination of the market for legal services for indigent 
criminal defendants. The Court described the normative base-line effectively in 
temporal terms: the state of affairs “[p]rior to the boycott.”62 That description 
holds constant everything other than the lawyers’ own coordination, as a matter 
of the legally relevant possible worlds, when there is no good reason to do so. To 
wit, the market might have been organized in any number of other ways: there 
may have been, say, a few large law firms bargaining with the District, or there 
may have been more than one buyer for the lawyers’ services. The particular 
normative baseline adopted by the Court amounts to a preference for 
determining prices through coordination that takes place within firm or 
enterprise boundaries, while frowning upon effects upon prices by means of 
coordination by smaller actors acting outside firm boundaries. This is a policy 
choice about structuring markets in a particular way. Moving reality away from 
that baseline, as the lawyers’ boycott almost did, does not pose an inherent 
 
 60.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 430–31.  
 61.  Id. at 434.  
 62.  Id. at 422. 
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economic harm or threat, in the manner that, for example, stunt flying in 
congested areas poses an inherent threat to physical safety. It simply moves 
toward a different market order, and a different allocation of coordination rights. 
In the market at issue, the Court assumed that the coordination that was 
already occurring was an appropriate part of the normative baseline against 
which any other scenario would be compared. The District, as the sole buyer of 
legal services for indigent criminal defendants, directly coordinated the market 
for those services, setting the hourly rates by legislation and coordinating the 
market along various other dimensions as well. Yet the Court chose to entirely 
disregard this coordination activity by the only buyer, while singling out the 
economic coordination of the individual providers of legal services for censure. 
Patterns of market coordination arise for all sorts of reasons,63 buyer power being 
one species.64 In all of them, public power is present to some degree or other, 
whether through background law or in some more active form. In short, there is 
no good reason to privilege the pre-strike rates paid to the lawyers as the 
normative or “competitive” ideal. Why, then, did the Court reach this 
conclusion? 
At the deepest level, the market order presupposed by the Court’s analytic 
framework does not privilege competition as such; rather, it privileges firms, and 
by extension enterprises, as the locus for the coordination of markets. The 
Court’s opinion extends to the District the same immunity for intra-enterprise 
economic coordination that it has long done for business entities. And it does so 
because it assumes the District is acting as an ordinary firm, not because it 
assumes it is acting as a government would. Indeed, the Court must assume the 
District is acting as a firm, because otherwise the primary premise of its 
argument—that the economically and socially appropriate rates must be set by 
competition, which it further glosses as requiring policing from interference of 
sellers’ collective action—would become incoherent. 
Firms are primary in the consensus analytic framework generally adopted by 
the courts for evaluating economic policy, and their halo sometimes extends to 
governmental entities when those entities are seen to behave sufficiently like 
business firms. This is evident in the various market participant doctrines that 
pepper the landscape of American law, including antitrust law itself. Often, 
governmental entities are permitted to engage in market coordination only if 
they can show that they are market actors: i.e., that that they are sufficiently firm-
like in that market.65 Assuming for the moment that it coherently delineates some 
set of attributes, this sort of criterion of course privileges firm-based economic 
coordination over, for example, direct public coordination of a market. While the 
 
 63.  See LEE, supra note 37; FLIGSTEIN, supra note 58. 
 64.  For one account of buyer power, see Nathan Wilmers, Wage Stagnation and Buyer Power: How 
Buyer-Supplier Relations Affect U.S. Workers’ Wages, 1978 to 2014, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 213, 213 2018. 
 65.  Market participant exception to federal preemption under the FAAAA; market actor 
exemption to federal preemption in case of federal deregulation legislation; market participant exception 
to the dormant commerce clause doctrine.  
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Court was not expressly evaluating the applicability of a market participant 
exception in Trial Lawyers, it effectively assumed that the District was acting as 
a firm would, and that therefore the lawyers’ rates ought to be set by competition. 
The court could have assumed that the District was acting in a public capacity by 
coordinating a market or engaging in economic policy-making, and that that 
policy should be given deference for that reason. However, the Court gave carte 
blanche to the District’s coordination while censuring individual sellers’ based on 
an assumption that the District was acting as a firm would. Again, to say 
otherwise would contradict the Court’s repeated invocation of competitive rates. 
B. Extending Antitrust’s Allocation of Coordination Rights to the First 
Amendment 
The Court then incorporated its preferred allocation of economic 
coordination rights, determined under antitrust, into its construction of the First 
Amendment law of expressive boycotts. The Court was principally concerned 
with the applicability of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,66 which also involved a 
boycott. The Court’s rejection of the application of Claiborne Hardware to the 
lawyers’ boycott revolved around the fundamental distinction it drew between 
the aims of the two boycotts: “special” advantage in the market (sought by the 
lawyers’ boycott), and “equality and freedom” that the Court agreed were 
“preconditions of the free market” (sought by the Claiborne Hardware 
boycott).67 Many have queried and pointed out the problem with putting “labor 
subordination” in a different constitutional category than “racial 
subordination.”68 Additionally, the characterization of the lawyers’ boycott as 
special market advantage—in contrast to a precondition of the free market—
relies upon the particular allocation of coordination rights that antitrust has 
chosen to espouse. As discussed in the preceding section, collective action among 
the lawyers would be no more a “special” market advantage than other forms of 
coordination that the Court permits. 
Thus, the purpose of the boycott was also defined as a private advantage from 
the outset.69 This is in contrast to the Court’s placement of consumer welfare in 
its normative framework as, effectively, a public value. But after all, consumer 
benefit is also simply a benefit to a particular set of actors in the market, yet the 
Court emphasized only the absence of public value in benefits to producers.70 
Whether one considers the situation specifically in terms of labor subordination 
 
 66.  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 558 (1982). 
 67. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 426. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 
U.S. 558 (1982). 
 68. Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of The First Amendment: Past as Prologue, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2088 (2018); see also Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust 
Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. UNIV. CHIC. L. J. 969 (2016). 
 69.  Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 427 (focusing on the fact that the objective of 
the boycott was to create an economic benefit to the lawyers, the sellers/producers in this market, to 
distinguish it from the public purposes implicated by Claiborne Hardware). 
 70.  Id. at 424. 
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or not, it is plausible to consider a producer-oriented norm like making a 
reasonable living, fair competition, or fair rates as a public value to be considered 
along with others, including consumer welfare.71 However one ultimately decides 
to value these considerations, the evaluation should not begin by placing one 
consideration in the category of public value and the other in the category of 
private value. In this and other ways, the Trial Lawyers opinion epitomizes the 
antitrust reasoning that dominates today, so far as ordering producers’ and 
workers’ interests are concerned. 
Importantly, this ordering is a judgment the Court imported into its 
construction of the First Amendment. Both the majority and the dissent in Trial 
Lawyers limited the First Amendment’s reach in the case of boycotts to the 
political rather than the economic, while reaching different conclusions regarding 
which side the lawyers’ boycott fell on.72 The majority’s application of this 
distinction relied upon reading Chicago School antitrust’s allocation of 
coordination rights into the First Amendment law of expressive boycotts, in that 
an unprotected economic boycott was defined in terms of “special” market 
advantage. In other words, the Court held that economic boycotts for reasonable 
rates by service-providers or small producers were unprotected by the First 
Amendment specifically because they seek “special advantage,” a concept that 
requires the normative framework of Chicago School antitrust and the firm 
exemption.73 Special market advantage is defined by a normative benchmark 
constituted by antitrust’s preferred and disfavored coordination mechanisms 
(firm-based and horizontal, respectively). The holding thus incorporates the 
conventional antitrust understanding that coordination outside business firms is 
special and usually disfavored—but it is now also a holding about what the First 
Amendment protects, not only about what is not permitted under antitrust. Thus, 
Trial Lawyers, the purest expression of the Court’s rule against horizontal 
coordination beyond firm boundaries, is itself an object lesson in the firm 
exemption, and it also extends this allocation of coordination rights to the First 
Amendment.74 
 
 71.  Indeed, such an idea of fairness, including the idea of fair price, has its own antitrust tradition, 
even if it has been largely submerged.  
 72.  Id. at 428 (“Only after recognizing the well-settled validity of prohibitions against various 
economic boycotts did we conclude in Claiborne Hardware that ‘peaceful, political activity such as that 
found in the [Mississippi] boycott’ are entitled to constitutional protection.”) The dissent, while reaching 
a different conclusion, largely accepted this framework as well. Id. at 437 (referring to the lawyers’ action 
as an “expressive political boycott”); Id. at 446 (“the facts at the very least do not exclude the possibility 
that the SCTLA succeeded due to political rather than economic power.”).  
 73.  Id. at 426. 
 74.  The Court also rejected the Court of Appeals’ holding, applying O’Brien, that antitrust rules be 
applied “prudently and with sensitivity” to First Amendment interests. The Court of Appeals had held 
that in the context of an expressive boycott such as the lawyers’ action, this requirement entailed express 
consideration of market power and barred application of the per se rule. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 233-34 (D.C. Cir.). The Court rejected this approach, holding that the 
integrity of the per se rule against horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries was a more important 
thing to protect than the expressive content of the boycott. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 
at 430. In this instance, the Court essentially abrogated First Amendment interests in favor of (its 
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IV 
TOWARD A RE-ALLOCATION OF COORDINATION RIGHTS 
Contemporary fissured business arrangements distill the preference for top-
down, hierarchical control of smaller players by more powerful firms that is 
already present in today’s antitrust framework, while often pushing beyond the 
boundaries set by the current expression of that framework in the surface 
structure of the law. They call out for a re-allocation of coordination rights under 
antitrust law. What criteria are available to effect this re-allocation, and on what 
basis should it be achieved? 
Our current framework recognizes one other relevant source of coordination 
rights, beyond the firm, and that of course is based in labor law. The labor 
exemption to antitrust essentially permits economic coordination that antitrust 
would otherwise condemn where individuals engaged in the performance of labor 
or services are sufficiently subject to the power and control of a firm, and lack 
significant power and control—including relevant ownership rights—of their 
own.75 From this perspective, the labor exemption has always—or at least, long—
been a limited qualification of the firm exemption, and it has been in a basic way 
dependent upon it. The limited qualification represented by the labor exemption 
is underlined by the fact that the collective power of labor—even if it were fully 
realized—cannot legally be brought to bear to contest basic firm or capital 
decisions, an outcome that Karl Klare and others have shown was not intrinsic to 
the Wagner Act itself, but was instead imposed by a contingent turn in the 
decisional law.76 Given this basic derivative relationship of the labor exemption 
to the firm exemption, it is then no wonder that the superficial undoing of the 
firm has further undone the labor exemption. 
How might we conceive of a new allocation of economic coordination rights 
that would avoid some of these problems, which have undermined the New Deal 
order almost beyond recognition? Attempts to broaden the labor exemption or 
to create new worker exemptions while retaining or copying its basic structure 
are unlikely to be sufficient. Fissured business structures show that the firm, 
which was never a platonic ideal to start with, will continue to change and 
mutate—partly of course in response to the law’s own allocation of coordination 
rights. Imagine if all workers or individual service-providers currently classified 
as independent contractors gained coordination rights. What would stop many 
firms who currently use independent contractors from moving to a system of 
contracting with, say, two to three person “firms” of workers—firms that are 
conveniently incorporated by signing ready-made forms in the company’s office 
upon hiring? These groups of workers would of course lack coordination rights 
in their bargaining with the firm that retains their services, and their intra-firm 
 
interpretation of) antitrust, rather than overtly rewriting the First Amendment in the image of Chicago 
School’s antitrust allocation of coordination rights.  
 75.  This is true whether “independent contractors” are covered by the labor exemption or not.  
 76.  Karl Klare, The Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal 
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). 
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coordination rights would be negligible. The law should not allocate coordination 
rights to working people on the condition of particular business structuring 
decisions made by others. But such decisions are the inevitable response to small-
bore redefinitions of the labor exemption, as fissuring itself teaches us. 
Instead, we might consider allocating coordination rights on the basis of 
power and social benefit. Importantly, to guide the application of these concepts, 
we must first discard the ideal-state competitive order as the default normative 
framework for antitrust and for economic regulation more generally. This is not 
to say that competition as a social process, referring to healthy business rivalry, is 
not important to antitrust law: it is, and ought to be balanced with appropriate 
and socially beneficial coordination. However, once we realize that the ideal-
state concept of competition that is currently presumed to form the basis for 
antitrust law is contributing very little—except as a smokescreen for other 
normative choices—then we need no longer view economic coordination as a 
special exception to the order of things. Thus, we need not look for conditions of 
deprivation, or powerlessness, as constituting the sole basis—aside from the firm 
exemption—for the appropriate exercise of coordination rights because they are 
an exception to an otherwise perfect order. That is what our current framework 
does, and it is also the assumption on which even the most ambitious reform 
proposals proceed.77 
Instead, once coordination is no longer a special exception to the ideal-state 
competitive order, we may think of allocating coordination rights not only in 
order to contest existing power over someone—in other words, to contest 
conditions of domination—but more broadly and positively, to allocate 
coordination rights in order to confer a social benefit and so long as the 
coordination does not result in power over someone else. In this vision, power 
would be a constraint upon coordination rather than the criterion of its 
permission. So, truck drivers would be able to engage in direct price coordination 
among each other, so long as that coordination did not result in the undue 
exercise of power over some other group of people: other truck drivers or 
customers, for example.78 They would not have to show that someone else has 
power over them—whether through prices, or something else—in order to 
engage in coordination. Indeed, within such a framework, each of the groups 
discussed in Part II—franchisees, Uber drivers, and independent contractors—
would quite plainly be allocated coordination rights. The precise scope of those 
rights should be determined in order to ensure that undue power over other 
groups does not result. Moreover, the availability of those rights would largely 
not depend upon unilateral decisions made by the lead firms in any of these 
arrangements in defining their relationships with workers, franchisees, or others 
 
 77.  See Alan Bogg & Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Association and the Right to Contest: Getting 
Back to Basics, in VOICES AT WORK (Tonia Novitz & Alan Bogg, eds. 2014). 
 78.  Such determinations ought to be informed by empirical study of the particular market or sector 
in which the coordination takes place, including any relevant power dynamics and including the effects 
of the coordination in question upon workers, consumers, and the broader community.   
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in their orbit. Thus, small players’ coordination rights would be more secure than 
those allocated by a broadened labor exemption or other new exemption. 
Conversely, on this alternative approach to the allocation of coordination 
rights, antitrust law would not permit powerful firms like Uber and McDonald’s 
to exert control over small, less-powerful players like drivers and franchisees. 
However, rather than prohibiting this coordination on the ground that it 
facilitates horizontal coordination that is presumptively bad, antitrust law ought 
to take the view that it is impermissible because it unduly exacerbates power 
imbalances and domination, and confers no social benefit that would not be 
better realized through more democratic forms of coordination. 
In both directions, a conscious re-allocation of coordination rights would 
work toward balancing undue asymmetries of power rather than exacerbating 
them, as the current antitrust framework does, particularly in the context of 
fissured business arrangements. In order to do so, it would also recognize that the 
current framework makes normative choices about allocating coordination rights 
that cannot be derived from putatively neutral principles supplied by the 
competitive ideal. 
 
